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Gender discrimination in the world of work is deeply rooted and widespread. This 
paper focuses on the ways in which historically rooted gender divisions of labour 
are replicated, and may be amplified, in the digital economy, and particularly in 
platform-mediated work. By “platform” we are referring to the two-sided internet 
applications used by businesses to source, manage and bill work, including services 
such as urban transportation, domestic work, and light repairs. 
Borrowing from anthropologist Aihwa Ong’s description of “capitalist discipline”, 
which explains the ways in which gender norms affect power dynamics in factory 
settings, the paper suggests a need to consider whether the digital economy, in 
particular the use of automated decision-making, introduces a new dimension to 
such power dynamics, and we suggest the new phrase “platform discipline”. The 
paper notes particularly the need for greater awareness of the ways in which artificial 
intelligence (AI) may amplify and accelerate existing labour market discrimination. 
Because of this phenomenon, it argues, more policy attention is needed to ensure 
equity in platform work.
Gender and other cultural norms are embedded in labour markets, and decisions 
about the use of digital technology reflect these norms.  Understanding this context 
will enable policymakers to address discrimination at the roots of platforms and not 
just at their surfaces. 
The paper is divided into four main sections:
1. The first section describes the historical and normative context for 
gendered divisions of labour in the digital economy.
2. The second section unpacks terminology relevant to the digital 
economy, in particular describing the phenomenon of platform discipline. 
3. The third section explains the relevance of longstanding constraints on 
women’s labour market participation — in particular spatial constraints 
and time poverty — to how they experience online or virtual space and 
platform work. 




The paper poses challenges to labour and development 
practitioners based on the author’s experience as a development 
professional. It suggests we have not sufficiently accounted 
for the effects of algorithmic bias in law or policy. Moreover, 
policymakers’ ability to address equity in the digital economy has 
been directly affected by narratives that not only elevate individual 
empowerment, but also may mask structural issues. 
The analysis supports two immediate recommendations:
1. First, policymakers can address and mitigate discrimination 
on platforms by making algorithms transparent and 
subject to regulation. This is likely to drive companies 
themselves to address and correct for discrimination in 
their data practices, described in this paper as “bias in.” 
2. Second, workers on platforms must have the ability to 
negotiate over terms and conditions of work. This not only 
requires adequate protections for new forms of collective 
action, but also ensuring a “human in command” in the 
platform interface to ensure workers have meaningful 
channels of communication with decision-makers.
 Gender and other 
cultural norms 
are embedded in 
labour markets, 
and decisions about 





Gender discrimination in the world of work has been well documented globally. 
New ways of working are being enabled by technology, and gender bias is affecting 
new digitally mediated labour markets. As in the labour market more generally, 
inequities in digital economy work may be heightened by the COVID-19 crisis. This 
is true across economies. This paper focuses particularly on platform work, and cites 
studies of platform work in various countries, including but not limited to lower- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs). Platform companies have globalized effects on a 
global, data-driven economy, and on cultural systems that are both global and local. 
Moreover, as some platforms erode labour protections and amplify discrimination 
across labour markets, common issues affect platform workers in all countries.
This paper summarizes some recent evidence on gender, labour, and platform 
work, draws observations from the author’s research and work as a development 
practitioner, and provides recommendations intended for development researchers, 
practitioners, and policymakers. Like any other sector, platforms can provide decent 
work or precarious work. And, like any technology, the code underlying platforms can 
potentially benefit or harm workers. In recent years, multilateral bodies have issued 
several important policy reports on the future of work that are intended to help 
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policymakers harness the benefits of technology and mitigate 
its harms. On the harms side, these reports have tended to 
focus on fears that technology will displace workers. To a lesser 
extent, the reports have examined the effects of platforms 
on quality of work. Our understanding is still evolving of the 
full range of the effects digitalization has had on workers. To 
ensure platforms support decent work, we must explore in 
depth the complex interrelationship between technology and 
culture.  That is the orientation of this paper. 
This is neither a paper about overall trends in the labour 
market, nor a comprehensive evidence review. It is a cautionary 
essay reminding policymakers that the introduction of new 
technologies into the economy will not correct longstanding 
power imbalances. The paper highlights historical parallels to 
previous technological shifts in the economy, as well as the 
interplay between these shifts and existing gender norms. 
It also highlights the dangers that machine-generated — or 
algorithmic — bias may exacerbate and how it may disguise 
discrimination in labour markets if policymakers and advocates 
do not intervene. If we want technology to serve the aim of 
correcting inequality, our starting point must be to identify the 
root causes of that inequality.
 To ensure 
platforms support 
decent work, we 
must explore in 
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Context: Gendered labour markets present and past
The present
Governments, advocates and other stakeholders had hoped to place a spotlight on 
gender equity in 2020. The year was intended to mark a quarter century of concerted 
global effort to address gender equality, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 
Fourth World Conference for Women and the comprehensive set of commitments 
launched as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Instead, 2020 was 
defined by a global pandemic, lockdowns, and other measures that rocked economies 
worldwide. Far from showcasing progress, the year exposed a rapid erosion of hard-
won gains for women in the economy.  Women and girls have been disproportionately 
leaving the paid workforce, falling back into poverty, and facing increasing care 
burdens (UN Women 2020). They are also facing a “shadow pandemic” of increased 
gender-based violence as the combination of stresses and social isolation leave 
women and girls more vulnerable than ever to abuse.
Gender gaps in labour markets persisted prior to 2020 (UN Women 2015; ILO 2016).  A 
gender gap in employment has persisted in every region, with the largest gaps in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Moreover, the data reflect that women have been 
disproportionately engaged in informal work and, in some developing regions, 75 
percent or more of women’s employment is informal (ILO 2016). Global research also 
found that women “do nearly two and a half times more unpaid care and domestic 
work than men” (UN Women 2015). Already behind, women experienced further 
erosion of economic security in 2020 (UN Women 2020). 
The lack of progress is striking, and highlights a need to examine our policy choices.  
The Beijing Declaration elevated detailed commitments to equality for women in the 
economy. Governments and multilateral organizations recognized and articulated a 
need to pair efforts to promote equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. In 
gender-related programming, this has encompassed approaches to promote women’s 
empowerment, focusing on the individual woman as the agent of change, and to 
promote gender equity, removing systemic and structural barriers. While both are 
needed, there are constraints and tradeoffs in choices regarding specific interventions. 
In labour market development approaches, women’s empowerment programs have 
sought to provide women themselves with the skills, abilities, and confidence they 
need to access better opportunities. Without addressing equity, however, women 
still face the same constraints to pursuing opportunities, notwithstanding their 
qualifications. A question throughout this paper is whether, in the digital economy, 
opportunities are excessively constrained by systemic barriers. The author’s experience 
with these tradeoffs (she has worked extensively as a development practitioner) 
shapes an equity-focused perspective throughout the paper. 
Barriers to opportunity are historically rooted and often invisible. This point will be 
central to the paper’s discussion of the culture of digital firms and platform discipline. 
For this reason, this paper not only summarizes the condition of present-day labour 
markets but also takes a brief tour into the past.
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Context: Gendered labour markets present and past
The future of work?
While the pandemic has had negative 
effects on other sectors of the economy, the 
digital economy is thriving. Social distancing 
requirements have provided a windfall to 
platform companies as the COVID-19 crisis 
has catalyzed a shift to digital platforms 
in labour markets (Thorbecke 2020). 
Governments are also adopting policies that 
will accelerate digital economic shifts post-
pandemic (World Trade Organization 2020). 
There has been an overall rise in the share of 
workers worldwide whose work is in some 
way mediated by a platform (ILO 2021).
There is a significant gender discrepancy in 
platform work. A new report from the ILO 
(2021) notes that while four in 10 workers on 
online and web-based platforms worldwide 
are women, in LMICs only about two in 10 
are women. Fully 20 percent of the global 
platform-mediated labour force is in India; 
however, only 20 percent of India’s platform 
workers are women. Platform-based and 
delivery sectors are largely male dominated. 
Women comprise fewer than 10 percent 
of workers in these sectors.  Women on 
platforms also experience a gender pay gap 
in some regions.
There are also clear differences in the nature 
of platforms entering traditionally feminized 
and traditionally masculinized low-wage 
sectors. In the transportation sector, two 
firms — Uber and Grab — dominate global 
markets with regional and local players 
struggling to compete. Yet in services such 
as beauty home care and domestic work, 
platforms tend to be national or subnational. 
There appears to be little evidence or 
discussion as to why this is the case and what 
effect it has on workers. 
4 in 10 workers on online and web-based 
platforms worldwide are women
2 in 10 workers on online and web-based 
platforms in LMICs are women
2 in 10 workers in the global platform-
mediated labour force are from India
Of these workers from India, 2 in 10 are women
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The past: labour market discrimination in earlier technological shifts
This is not the first time a technological shift has altered the gender dimensions 
of labour markets. The expansion of light manufacturing into previously agrarian 
economies created factories with predominantly female workforces; indeed, 
employers openly stated a preference for young female workers (Ong 1987). 
Improvements in information and communications technology led to the 
establishment of call centers around the world where feminized workforces were also 
preferred (Abraham 2008). 
A similar pattern of feminized, low-wage work characterized the early days of the 
computing industry. It is important to keep in mind that as this new industry created 
new types of occupations, it did not do so in a vacuum. There is a rich body of 
scholarship detailing the ways in which occupational segregation has reflected social 
and cultural norms, and how political structures have served to entrench social groups 
into specific types of economic activity, not only in pre-industrial times, but also in 
industrial economies (Thompson 1963; Willis 1977). Keeping this in mind, it is no 
surprise that gendered labour market dynamics arose in the United Kingdom in the 
post-World War II era at a time when the United States and U.K. were competing for 
dominance in the industry (Hicks 2017). 
Women in the U.K. had been able to enter the clerical workforce in large numbers 
during the war and thus acquired the necessary skills for the emerging computer 
industry. Yet industry and government together insisted on defining the work as low-
skill since it was, by this period, principally being performed by women. This workforce 
was affected by laws such as marriage bars that compelled companies to fire women 
once they married, and wage ceilings premised on the assumption that women’s 
incomes should be supplemental and not primary. This pushed skilled women out of 
the industry and the U.K. lost its dominant position in computing.  
The US maintained its dominance not by elevating skilled women workers but by 
masculinizing the field of work. The popular film Hidden Figures dramatized the story 
of the first human computers in the United States in the 1950s; these were Black 
women who were relegated to jobs considered beneath the status of the white male 
engineers for whom they worked. From this period through the early 1980s, data entry 
was regarded as largely secretarial (i.e. feminized) work and therefore poorly paid. As 
more and more men entered data processing, wages rose and the status of such jobs 
also shifted. The shifts had everything to do with cultural norms. “Managers began 
Factory work during 
the expansion of 
manufacturing
Clerical work during 
World War II
Data entry and human 
computers in the 
emergence of computing
Pattern of feminized 
low-wage  labour during 
technological shifts
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picking coders less on the basis of aptitude and 
more on how well they fit a personality type: 
the acerbic, aloof male nerd.” (Thompson 2019). 
In brief, this new sector adapted to fit existing 
gender norms.
Notably it was during these early days of coding 
that the famous maxim “garbage in, garbage out” 
was coined, which recognized that machines 
replicate the mistakes of human coders. Yet it has 
been only in recent years that we have begun 
to recognize that we have created “bias in, bias 
out” models in AI. This will be discussed in more 
depth later in the paper. First, however, the paper 
spotlights the importance of understanding 
gender and social norms within a globalized 
corporate culture. Hicks (2017) has detailed the 
intentional policy decisions that underpinned 
gender divisions in the U.K.’s computing 
workforce. As these decisions demonstrate, “bias 
in” starts at the top. Today, major tech firms are 
rife with examples of workplace discrimination. 
The recent high-profile firing of Timnit Gebru, an 
AI researcher who was spotlighting algorithmic 
bias, is just one manifestation of a broader 
pattern of discrimination against women of 
colour in this field (Schwab 2021). That pattern 
of gender discrimination has been documented 
through a project titled Elephant in the Valley 
(Mundy, The Atlantic, April 2017).1 Given 
evidence of gender bias within corporate culture, 
we must consider how corporate leaders regard 
workers in AI supply chains and on platforms, 
and the possibility that systems are encoded 
with bias.
1 The project and primary data can be 
accessed at https://www.elephantinthevalley.com/
During the early days of 
coding, the famous maxim 
“garbage in, garbage 
out” was coined, which 
recognized that machines 
replicate the mistakes of 
human coders. Yet only in 
recent years have we begun 
to recognize that we have 
created “bias in, bias out” 
models in AI.
Call centers following 




This section provides a framework for understanding some of the invisible 
forms of influence that platforms may exert both on individual workers and 
social norms. It coins the term platform discipline, which is a refinement 
of Ong’s explanation of capitalist discipline. This section defines key terms 
and provides an overview of research on how platforms exert control over 
workers. It also provides an explanation of how existing societal bias can be 
exacerbated by artificial intelligence (AI).
Understanding bias
Is technology affected by human bias? A small but growing community of 
scholars is pioneering the research techniques needed to expose implicit 
bias in coding.  Techniques to reverse-engineer seemingly neutral codes have 
exposed encoded gender and racial discrimination (Noble 2018; Ajunwa 
2020; Benjamin 2019). A study by Steed and Caliskan (2021) uses a controlled 
experiment that demonstrates conclusively what other researchers have 
exposed through reverse-engineering of observed patterns. The researchers 
administered the IAT, a well-regarded sociological index to measure subjective 
bias in human subjects, to machines trained to learn. They found that machine 
learning models pick up and embed subjective bias in their automated 
decision-making. Indeed, machines demonstrated roughly the same patterns 
of gender and racial bias as humans. 
In sum, there is ample evidence of the bias in, bias out phenomenon in the 
development of AI. As AI is deployed for more and more automated decision-
making, it can amplify existing forms of social exclusion. For example, the use 
of automated decision-making on platforms for hiring were demonstrated 
to reproduce gender and racial discrimination in applicant selection 
(Ajunwa 2020). Another team of researchers found that Facebook algorithms 
introduced bias into their targeting of job advertisements. The more gender 
bias already existed in an industry, the more likely the algorithm would target 
Facebook ads to the dominant gender, as the algorithm had been coded to 
assume that past patterns predicted future trends in employment (Imana, 
Korolova and Heidemann, forthcoming 2021). Comparative data for LinkedIn, 
however, found no evidence of bias, which suggests the ability of firms to 
correct for bias in. LinkedIn spokespeople confirmed that they had been aware 
of and sought to correct for this problem (Horwitz 2021). 
Evidence is scarce regarding the effects of automated decision-making 
and algorithmic bias on platform workers in lower- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). Yet, as Benjamin (2019) has noted, “Coded inequity makes 
discrimination easier, faster, and even harder to challenge.” We need to expand 
the evidence and advocacy stimulated by existing research and support 
emerging scholarship in other parts of the world where these trends may be 
even harder to expose and address.
What is implicit bias?
The Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) was designed by 
sociologists Greenwald, 
Banaji, and Nosek to 
expose group-based 
preferences, stereotypes, 
and identities that may 
not be accessible to 
conscious awareness. This 
research demonstrated 
the pervasiveness of what 
is variously called “implicit 
bias”, “unconscious bias”, 
or “blind spots.” Further 
research has detailed the 
ways in which unconscious 
reactions formed on the 




In her seminal work on women factory workers in newly 
industrializing Malaysia, Aihwa Ong described how local 
communities’ gender norms were disrupted by the migration of 
young women from villages to urban areas for factory jobs. Ong 
described how the authority previously imposed by males in 
these workers’ villages and families was replaced by new forms of 
capitalist discipline, namely male managers in the modern factory. 
This paper argues that platform work is exerting a new form of 
capitalist discipline.  
As described earlier in the paper, prior technological shifts 
have in some cases created feminized workforces. While this 
phenomenon has had some benefits for women individually and 
collectively, Ong’s insights are critical as we consider discussions 
of empowerment and equity in platform work. This paper has 
noted above and will discuss further below the dangers of viewing 
platform work solely through the prism of whether it is considered 
empowering for individual women workers. Policymakers must 
consider how any new economic activity is layered into existing 
social stratifications. And now we know that codes and algorithms 
are not neutral. So we must ask: does automated decision-making 
interact with and perhaps amplify existing gender bias in new 
forms of platform discipline?  








Platform work: A definition
Marketplaces such as Etsy, aligned with traditional forms of self-employment, 
are part of the platform sector but are not the primary subject of this paper. 
The focus here is mainly on platform work where workers bid for tasks with 
terms and conditions set by platforms. These include both web-based tasks 
and location-based, person-to-person services, as the author will describe. The 
latter form of exchange may replace existing social networks commonly used 
by job-seekers in the informal sector. 
The term “gig work” has become common to describe platform work; however, 
this term does not sufficiently differentiate platform work from all other forms 
of informal work, particularly in developing economies where reliance on 
short-term gigs for income is common. Platforms targeting low-wage workers 
in typically informal jobs, which include domestic services, delivery services, 
light repair, home beauty care, and transportation, use APIs to assign work 
in digitally intermediated tasks. APIs replace the social networks or human 
brokers that would otherwise connect those seeking to perform tasks with 
prospective clients. The role of race, class, and gender in informal labour 
markets is salient to our understanding of the so-called gig economy. Women 
remain more likely to be in informal work than men worldwide, particularly in 
LMICs (ILO 2016). This is relevant to the following discussion of platform work, 
as platform work may be structured to take advantage of precarity — a lack 
of economic stability or security — and its gender-differentiated effects on 
informal workers. 
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What is platform work?
This paper uses the term 
“platform” to describe a 
business model in which 
corporate entities rely on 
a two-sided application 
programming interface 
(API) and the internet to 
“source, schedule, manage, 
ship, and bill task-based, 




Platform discipline at work
APIs introduce new forms of control over work and workers. This 
section describes three common manifestations of platform discipline: 
rating systems, reward and penalty systems, and the disintermediation 
of social relations.  To be clear, these are issues that affect workers 
of all genders; a more detailed treatment of the overlay of platform 
discipline and existing gender discrimination will be addressed in the 
next section of the paper. 
Ratings
Platforms enable clients to rate workers, typically on some kind of 
simplified scale such as a five-star system. These individual ratings 
are then fed into automated decision-making systems. In the system, 
clients become unwitting instruments of control over workers. While 
each individual client may believe they are giving direct feedback to 
the platform worker, on most platforms, workers do not see individual 
feedback. Decisions are based on the average rating, and many 
platforms require average ratings well above the median point for 
continued assignments (Raval and Dourish 2016). Ratings reflect social 
norms, and may therefore reflect normative bias (Rosenblat et. al. 2016). 
Ratings serve to coerce workers by using the threat of removal, or 
deactivation, from the platform. A study by Tandem Research of 
platform domestic workers in South Africa underscored how this 
creates subtle forms of control. Workers reported that they were urged 
to maintain a rating of 4.75 (out of a possible 5). Low ratings prompted 
warnings, and three consecutive ratings of below two stars resulted 
in worker accounts being deactivated. Workers had little to no ability 
to negotiate these ratings, coercing them to accept conditions they 
might otherwise contest. Moreover, although the rating system in 
principle works both ways, workers on multiple platforms have verified 
that client ratings are rarely, if ever, used. Domestic workers in the 
Tandem study stated, “We cannot choose clients so even if they have 
a low rating we still have to go.” In a similar case, platform domestic 
workers in Brazil described how the platform would calculate the 
value of a job based on the work described by the client. However, one 
interviewee described how she would often find additional cleaning 
tasks at the assigned location, and fearful that she would receive a 
poor rating if she did not complete them, would put in the extra time 
and work for no additional payment (Reporter Brasil 2019).
The Tandem Research team found, “Clients often don’t understand the 
rating system, and their ratings are often based on a whim, or deeply 
ingrained racial and class stereotypes.” Similarly, female drivers for 
ride-hailing platforms have reported they believe they are generally 
subject to lower client ratings than their male counterparts.2
2  Author interviews with ride-hailing drivers in South Africa, July 2019, 
United States, September 2019.
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Platforms automate decision-making by using data gathered through continuous surveillance 
of workers and then fed into AI systems. The point is to optimally extract labour through 
automated incentives and penalties. For example, algorithms that are trained on worker data 
may control automated use of penalties and rewards to incentivize workers to increase and 
accelerate the rate of tasks performed, work at all hours, and to take on externalized costs 
(Gray and Suri 2019). Algorithms also exert discipline by automatically assigning penalties to 
workers for failing to be available at all times (ILO 2021). There may be a pernicious effect of 
this reward and penalty system on gender-specific time poverty, as this paper will discuss in 
the section on hypervigilance. 
Disintermediation of social relations
Platform discipline also results in the disintermediation of relationships (Kellogg et.al. 2020). 
In other words, by removing direct human communication between client and worker, 
automated management removes the possibility of empathy in decision-making. In cases 
where stress, illness or emergency situations interfere with work, workers are unable to 
negotiate over timing or performance of a task, as there is no human in the loop.  This leaves 
them with potentially fewer options than non-platform workers.  Low wage, informal workers 
who rely on direct relationships with clients and social networks may have more flexibility to 
negotiate terms and conditions of work than platform workers. Disintermediation removes the 
ability to communicate and negotiate.
Domestic workers interviewed in the Tandem Research study reported their fear of being 
deactivated over last-minute cancellations due to unforeseen family care needs. 
“I was really ill and couldn’t go to a booking so I contacted support through the app in 
the morning. No one answered me. The client called me at 9.30 to ask me why I wasn’t 
there yet for my appointment and I realized SweepSouth had not contacted the client 
or addressed my request at all. Later, this was included in my cancelled booking even 
though I was genuinely sick” (Tandem/Cloudburst 2020).
The researchers conclude, 
The one-sided nature of the ratings systems creates a structural domination of the 
platform over workers which is dependent on worker fungibility … Workers are also 
unlikely to cancel bookings because of the loss of earning potential. Autonomy is thus 
constrained both because of platform design and broader labour market conditions 
(Tandem/Cloudburst 2020).
Hunt et. al. (2019) cite similar concerns in their interviews with platform domestic workers in 
Kenya. Although, technically, workers are not forced to perform the service, disciplinary tactics 
employed by the platform increase their economic insecurity with each cancellation.  This 
constrains workers’ actual choice over time and performance of tasks.  
The disruption of normal social relations may also lead clients to engage in behavior they 
might otherwise consider socially unacceptable. An example is the practice of “tip-baiting.” 
During a surge in online grocery delivery work and long waits for service due to the pandemic 
and lockdowns, some customers were offering extra tips and then cancelling them after the 
delivery was made. Interviews with shoppers, who were predominantly female, highlighted 
their awareness of the disintermediation problem. One shopper noted that she was “literally 
exposing myself” and risking the health of her family members, something she doubted 
the customers understood. Another shopper whose tip was taken away because some of 
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the items requested were simply sold out said, “I 
tried my best. A lot of people are detached from 
the situation going on” (O’Brien and Yurieff, CNN 
Business, April 9, 2020).
Although this example is from the United States, 
the disintermediation of social relations is a factor 
across geographies. In India, a thriving home 
beauty care services market has given rise to new 
platforms such as Urban Company (Zainab 2020). 
While the company experienced a 102 percent 
surge in revenue in 2020, women beauty workers 
on the platform reported loss of income and 
lack of information necessary for their economic 
decision-making, particularly regarding lockdown 
measures and health and safety protocols. 
Unfortunately, we have no comparative data on 
the economic resilience of home beauty workers 
who made bookings through non-platform social 
networks. However, this paper’s author believes 
the disintermediation factor, which left workers 
entirely without information regarding the client 
base, left them in a more precarious situation than, 
for example, if they had been able to communicate 
with clients and determine whether or not the 
clients still intended to use their services in future.3 
3  This mirrors the overall and now well-
documented way in which social media serves to make 
people feel distanced from speech and behavior that 
they would be unlikely to display in real life.
1. Ratings
2. Penalties and rewards
3. Disintermediation of social reiations
? !
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In cases where stress, illness 
or emergency situations 
interfere with work, workers 
are unable to negotiate over 
timing or performance of a 
task, as there is no human in 
the loop.
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Gender norms at work and platform amplification
The previous section explored the ways in which automated management of workers 
on platforms can impose new forms of discipline and control. This section explores a 
gap in the literature on gender in the digital economy. As outlined above, gender bias 
in the world of work generally, and especially in low-wage, precarious work, is well 
documented. Moreover, recent research has conclusively demonstrated that, in the 
absence of intentional corrective measures, algorithms amplify bias.  Yet policymakers 
lack evidence of the ways that algorithmic biases may perpetuate and amplify existing 
forms of labour market discrimination. Policymakers must be attentive to the ways in 
which hidden, automated decisions may reinforce gender norms that reduce women’s 
ability to participate in labour markets.
Overall, the section focuses on two important, longstanding and well-known 
constraints to women’s economic activity: time poverty and gendered spatial 
constraints. Women experience time poverty as a result of unpaid care burdens. 
Although researchers have spotlighted the ways in which unpaid care work has 
contributed directly to formal economic output for decades, our analysis is hindered 
by a continued lack of comprehensive data on the full scope of the unpaid care 
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economy.4 This is relevant to the discussion below, as time poverty is 
an important factor limiting women’s ability to access platform work 
and may also represent a vast hidden subsidy to the digital economy.
Women experience constraints to their physical mobility and access 
to public spaces that are kept in place by norms, policies, laws, and 
the fear of gender-based violence. Some common examples are 
exposure to sexual harassment in transit, reducing women’s ability to 
travel safely to and from work sites, harassment within the workplace 
itself, and restrictions regarding night work imposed in the name of 
protecting women’s safety. In brief, actual gender-based violence 
reinforces cultural constraints that restrict women from certain 
workspaces under the guise of protecting them from harm. As this 
section will discuss, these actual spatial constraints are replicated in 
online or virtual space.
This section argues that the digital economy may be structured to 
profit from well-embedded inequities in the unpaid care economy, and 
may provide an unregulated space where gender-based violence can 
thrive and exacerbate existing social constraints. Both of these issues 
belie the supposed neutrality of platforms. The narrative of flexibility 
is particularly fraught. Many platforms openly advertise the benefits 
of having a flexible work schedule that can be adapted to unpaid care 
burdens. Yet this message fundamentally underscores the acceptability 
of unpaid care burdens, shifting the policy debate away from the 
issue of what must be done to alleviate the burdens so caregivers can 
enter paid employment and, instead, elevating demand for a casual, 
informal, on-demand workforce. We must also pay attention to how 
platforms support shifts from formal workplaces to home-based 
work, and the danger that this change will reinforce patriarchal norms 
regarding unpaid care burdens and safe spaces for women. 
4  While advocates in Beijing in the mid-1990s identified a need to not 
only collect data, but also include analysis in the System of National Accounts, 
governments continue to lack any serious investment even in the data collec-
tion. An ILO report published in 2018, Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future 
of Decent Work, represents the first systematic global compilation of data by 
any multilateral organization. 
  








Just as norms, policies and other barriers can restrict women’s access to physical 
work spaces, women may also experience barriers to accessing virtual (online) space. 
Capital costs for equipment are one element. It is known that women experience 
discrimination in access to capital (UN Women 2015). There may be a relationship 
between lack of access to capital, lack of access to internet and computers, and 
gender-differentiated access to platform work. Differentiated control over household 
accounts may also mean women are less able to invest in the technology they need to 
avail themselves of platform work opportunities. 
After Access has documented the gender digital divide in several countries (2018). 
The study documented not only differential access to hardware such as computers 
and smartphones, but also cultural barriers that discouraged women in some regions 
from participating in social media. Some respondents to the study explained that 
their partners or families discouraged their spending time online for fear they would 
engage in inappropriate online social interactions. This suggests that addressing 
the gender digital divide will require addressing the broader constraints to women’s 
engagement in public spaces, and understanding online activity as a virtual public space.
Virtual spatial constraints are reinforced by social norms around unpaid care work. 
In Ghost Work (2019), Gray and Suri interview web-based platform workers. Kala, a 
worker in India, works on Microsoft’s internal platform. A former electrical engineer, 
she left the workforce after having children. While her husband and in-laws did not 
support the idea of her returning to formal employment, they accepted the idea of her 
entering gig work, as it would not interfere with her unpaid care duties. “Kala’s in-laws 
disapprove of how much time she spends on the family’s computer. They’d prefer she 
spent more time with them, she says.” In this case, cultural norms intersect with access 
to limited equipment (a single family computer) to create gendered barriers to Kala’s 
access to work. 
With available evidence on divides in access to hardware, and what is known about 
labour markets more generally, we can make certain assumptions. In households 
reliant on a single device, women likely have less access to shared hardware such 
as computers and smartphones. There is also a question of children’s access, 
particularly if long-term shifts in education mean children need to access more and 
more educational content online. The recent ILO research suggests that women with 
childcare responsibilities who do web-based work disproportionately work at night 
and forego sleep.5   
5 Presentation by Uma Rani on “The Role of Digital Platforms in Transforming the World 
of Work with a gender lens”, April 14, 2021. We would like to thank Uma Rani, Senior Economist, 
ILO Geneva for providing us with statistic used for infographics in this paper.
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The normative aspects of the gender digital divide may be reinforced and amplified by 
the spiraling problem of online gender-based violence and harassment. For location-
based platform work it is important to recognize that women workers in informal jobs 
such as domestic work and beauty home care have long been exposed to high levels 
of sexual harassment (UN Women 2020). It can therefore be assumed that there is a 
high risk of sexual harassment in such work whether or not it is mediated by platforms. 
The question is whether the platforms in any way affect the level of risk.
As detailed earlier, rating systems that allow workers to rate clients are rarely, if ever, 
used to hold clients accountable for mistreatment. Moreover, some platforms simply 
do not provide workers with the option to review employers or report fraudulent job 
postings (Tandem/Cloudburst 2020). Both women and men drivers for ride-hailing 
apps who experienced harassment reported a failure of the platform to identify 
and penalize such clients (Athreya 2020). Hunt et. al. (2019) interviewed workers 
providing in-home services. These interviews confirmed that many women workers 
felt platforms did not sufficiently vet clients and that even when they complained 
about mistreatment by a client, no further action was taken. “Mercy, who offered 
beauty services, automatically rejected all requests from male clients (due to fear 
of harassment),” they report. Mateesceu and Nguyen (2019) have described the 
pernicious interaction between ratings for workers and sexual harassment. Platform 
workers providing domestic services may avoid reporting sexual harassment for fear of 
negative ratings from clients, they report.
Extensive interviews with female massage workers in the United States revealed 
that the disintermediation aspect of platforms left workers highly vulnerable. On the 
platform Zeel, clients assumed they could not be held accountable, as their financial 
transaction was with the platform and not directly with the worker, leaving the worker 
with limited access to client data. This, coupled with workers’ fear of low ratings and 
deactivation combined in an intimate workspace to create cover for harassment 
(Merchant 2019). The company itself faced very limited liability for incidents of 
violence against masseuses. Similar research on app-based massage services is 
currently underway in Thailand.6  
The ways in which platforms serve to mask the identity of clients puts other location-
based platform workers at risk, as well. Rizk et. al. (2018) noted, “Both Uber and 
Careem drivers are concerned that clients are not screened in the same way as the 
drivers  … coupled with no screening for passengers, there is also an added concern 
of being asked to drive to certain remote areas, which they consider more dangerous 
for women than men.” The authors conclude that most women drivers feel helpless 
to stop incidences of harassment from taking place and feel they have to take on the 
burden of their own safety.  This may also constrain their ability to choose to accept 
rides at times and to locations that put them at risk.
6  Kriangsak Teerakowtkajorn, interview with the author, February 11, 2021.
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The studies covered in this paper do not detail online harassment facing web-based 
workers. Yet what is known about sexual harassment in virtual space generally suggests 
there are gender-specific risks. As Gurumurthy and Jha note, women and minorities 
have already learned to adapt and self-moderate their online presence to avoid risk 
of harassment (2020).  Advocates have for several years been documenting the rise in 
online sexual harassment as a means of targeting and silencing women in virtual space 
(Lopez 2018). Women in professions that require the use of an online public profile, 
such as journalists, have been shown to face extraordinarily high levels of violent 
sexual threats online. Use of platform and app geolocation features for stalking is also 
a possible concern for women platform workers, though this is another area where we 
lack primary research (Ng 2019). Are the same features also enabling online stalking 
or harassment of workers online by co-workers or clients, or leading women to avoid 
certain platform engagements? We need further evidence on this subject.
Photo: Visual News Associates / World Bank
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Figure 1. Share of female platform workers with young children (0-5 years) (Source: ILO).
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Unpaid care work and hypervigilance
As noted earlier, women continue to shoulder substantial unpaid care 
burdens worldwide, and this leads to time poverty that limits their ability to 
engage in paid economic activity. The effects of time poverty on women’s 
work on platforms are not yet fully documented. The 2021 ILO report found 
that approximately 23 percent of all women who perform work on platforms 
have children under the age of six; however, that figure is 50 percent for 
respondents from LMICs (Figure 1).
Unpaid care work is a significant hurdle to gender parity in location-based 
work. For women drivers on ride-hailing platforms in Cairo, “the priority for 
most drivers remains the need to balance this work with household labour. 
Household obligations dictate their working schedules, needing to ensure 
childcare for their own children or grandchildren, or through curfews imposed 
by husbands” (Rizk et. al. 2018). For these women drivers, limited changes in 
household dynamics such as increased financial autonomy took place in the 
context of patriarchal norms that continued to constrain time use and direct 
women’s time toward unpaid care work.
The need for hypervigilance further amplifies this problem. Several studies 
describe how platforms exacerbate the problem of time poverty both due to 
the acceleration of pace (tasks posted may disappear within seconds), and 
because of the sunk search costs to find such tasks. Those engaged in web-
based tasks spend a significant proportion of their time in unremunerated 
work searching for suitable tasks. This is also a factor for location-based 
workers, who must be logged onto the platform and idle but available until 
they are assigned a task. “Hypervigilance is a necessity for top earners,” state 
Gray and Suri. 
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Those … who make the most money spend hours monitoring 
their dashboards and scrolling through pages upon pages of 
job postings … They must be ready to snap up a well-paying 
or fast-and-easy task the second it pops onto their screen, lest 
another worker click the link and accept it first (Gray and Suri 2019). 
Veena Dubal’s recent interviews with low-wage female platform 
workers in the eastern United States also highlight a common finding 
across similar studies: searching for work online requires time that 
women often simply do not have.  
“If I work 12–16 hours a day, I’ll make maybe $5/hour. But 
that’s when there is work, but when you’re sitting in between 
jobs and you consider that time, when you’re just looking for 
work, then the hourly wage falls dramatically. There are so 
many of us now, and fewer quality jobs. Sometimes I wake up 
in the middle of the night just to see if I can grab some good 
requests” (Dubal 2020).
As noted above, platform work has been promoted by some firms as 
providing the flexibility needed to enable those involved in caring for 
family members to engage in economic activity. However, as many 
of the studies surveyed highlighted, platform work and the ability 
to be hypervigilant is actually most accessible to those who have no 
unpaid care burdens, and who therefore would also be most available 
to obtain formal work during regular, set working hours. Anwar and 
Graham (2020) note that for many male workers interviewed there was 
a status-enhancing element to the idea that they were entrepreneurs; 
however, women did not speak of a desire to be entrepreneurs, but 
rather the need to juggle care burdens at home. 
What has not yet been exposed or measured is the assigned gender 
differential or handicap to those who lack ability to be hypervigilant 
and constantly available to respond to tasks. Women on platforms are 
more likely than men to have unpaid care burdens and are more likely 
to lack true flexibility to respond to the platforms; rather, they need 
to fit tasks in between care duties. Yet the algorithms reward those 
who are most constantly available with more desirable and lucrative 
assignments. Is the algorithm, over time, reinforcing a bias against 
those with greater unpaid care burdens? And, over time, does this lead 
to systematic discrimination against women in assignments?
 Searching for work 
online requires 
time that women 
often simply do 
not have. Is the 
algorithm, over 
time, reinforcing 
a bias against 




Building blocks for positive change
Platforms have created shifts in social relations. Previous technological shifts, by 
reorganizing work, created new forms of workplace discipline, but also new forms of 
workplace-based solidarity. So, too, in the digital economy there are both positives 
and negatives to the disruption of social relations. Some forms of social realignment 
may be taking place as a result of platform work, including new social networks that 
allow for organizing.
Gray and Suri discuss the emergence of new forms of solidarity through ad hoc 
networks enabled by platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook, where platform 
workers often form their own groups. Platforms themselves have in some cases 
sought to replicate and create a virtual water cooler, but with limited success 
(Kellogg et. al. 2019). One of the platforms in the South Africa domestic work study 
created a WhatsApp group for workers; however, workers reported they felt that the 
presence of a manager in each group prevented them from freely speaking to each 
other (Tandem/Cloudburst, 2020). On their own, platform workers on this and other 
platforms in South Africa did use WhatsApp to connect with one another. 
Rizk et. al. provide a detailed example of what new social relations can look like in 
practice and how they can benefit women workers:
Some drivers have formed a group, including both women and men, and 
they physically meet up regularly. They express having developed a sense 
of belonging to this group. Many participants expressed that working as 
drivers has allowed them to expand their networks and connections, forming 
communities of support with other female drivers. Common platforms used 
to communicate are WhatsApp or Facebook groups. Drivers also spoke of an 
application that they use to communicate with both male and female drivers 
when they are in situations that require assistance.
With the right transparency and accountability measures in place, APIs could correct 
for the information asymmetries present in traditional social networks. Platforms 
could provide more transparent information to workers about potential jobs than 
they might obtain from traditional networks or labour brokers. This, in turn, could 
increase workers’ choices and bargaining power. The platform Babajob in India (now 
defunct) provided workers with information about prevailing market wages, allowing 
them to determine whether specific employers were offering above or below market 
rates (Tandem/Cloudburst 2019). A combination of greater information sharing and 
transparency on platforms, and more intentional support for ad hoc spaces where 
workers can safely share information, could provide a partial corrective to platform 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Gender bias in the world of work is 
amplified by algorithms in the absence 
of corrective measures. Women face 
multiple barriers to participating in 
platform work, including:
• Gender digital divide
• Sexual harassment
• Unpaid care work
Gender bias in 
platform work
25
Equity in the platform economy
The global transformation to a digital economy was already well underway when 
COVID-19 began its spread. Over the past year, pandemic-induced economic 
dislocations exacerbated reliance on digital intermediaries in the world of work. 
Platform companies were winners in this shift. Now that change has been catalyzed, 
we must assume it will continue in the post-pandemic recovery. If we take a gender-
blind approach to this profound technological and labour market shift, we risk erasing 
the incremental gains women have made in the world of work.  This section will note 
some gaps in development policy and practice that we need to recognize if we are to 
begin to address them. It will then provide two recommendations to address some of 
the issues this paper has identified.
Minding the gaps: Cautions for policymakers
The future of work has been a subject of increasing interest to policymakers in recent 
years. Governments and multilateral organizations have sought to determine how 
best to address labour market dislocations in what is sometimes termed the “fourth 
industrial revolution” (Schwab 2015). Some studies have addressed gender aspects of 
labour market displacement (Florito et. al. 2018; Picot and Spath 2020; OECD 2018). For 
the most part, such analysis has taken an ahistoric approach to the data on gendered 
digital divides. In other words, recommendations have oriented policymakers toward 
addressing immediate gaps in access to technology, not correcting for underlying, 
historically rooted inequity. As argued in the first part of this paper, gender equity 
cannot simply focus on providing greater opportunity in the form of technology 
or skills. Policymakers must also address longstanding barriers, such as the need to 
reduce and redistribute the unpaid care burden. 
This paper has also called out the need for more data and analysis on ways in which 
artificial intelligence may be further amplifying traditional social and cultural barriers 
to the world of work. The following points are intended to provide scope for careful 
analysis of policy and development interventions, to ensure that we correct for our 
own blind spots and do not inadvertently feed into the exacerbation of bias and 
labour market exclusion.
Question assumptions about technology
First, policymakers must avoid excessive faith in the ability of technology to solve 
complex problems. Anwar and Graham summarize the problem of policymakers in 
lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs): faced with longstanding and seemingly 
intractable unemployment and underemployment, development practitioners and 
policymakers have been attracted to innovation. “It is at this moment that many 
tend to look towards digital technologies and internet connectivity as a panacea for 
inherent labour market systems problems,” they state. 
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Among other examples, USAID invested in supply-side platforms like 
Babajob (India) and Bong Pheak (Cambodia) that held the promise of 
providing more and better information to job-seekers. From a donor 
perspective, the intent was to smooth labour markets, removing 
frictions and inefficiencies. Some also argued that platforms would 
reduce discrimination in labour markets. This belied policymakers’ 
belief that platforms did not impose discriminatory barriers to entry, 
and that tasks would be distributed on a randomized basis where 
the gender, ethnicity, race, or migration status of the worker would 
have no effect on the assignment. We now know this is not the case. 
Later studies commissioned by USAID, ODI, and other development 
agencies suggest the increase in choice and flexibility appears to be 
largely on the employer/client side. The findings of these studies are 
well-summarized by the following quote from an article on platform 
work in Indonesia: “Digital platforms, then, have not removed frictions 
— they have shifted them onto someone else” (Qadri 2020). Donors 
and policymakers should invest in increasing gendered power analysis 
around these kinds of interventions to ensure that any inherent 
inequities in design are addressed up front.
Avoid over-reliance on the notion of individual empowerment
Optimism in technological fixes for difficult problems is not accidental; 
cultural narratives have continuously reinforced the promise of 
technology. Metcalf et. al. (2019) in their discussion of the ethics 
of technology note, “Silicon Valley logic holds that trenchant social 
problems can be addressed through innovative technical solutions 
developed by those with the most aptitude and creative energy and 
that an unencumbered market will recognize, reward and disseminate 
the best solutions.”  
The conflation of the terms “technology” and “innovation” in policy has 
masked the ways in which technology can actually serve regressive 
purposes, from a social and cultural viewpoint. Wendy Liu’s memoir of 
her aspirations to succeed in the culture of Silicon Valley provides keen 
insight into an industry that sustains a narrative that winners succeed 
solely by dint of their individual merit, yet perpetuates a culture of 
discrimination against women and people of colour. As Dubal (2020) 
notes, this also applies to platform workers in low-wage task work, as 
the digital economy “engineers an anti-welfare subjectivity: a sense 
that they could do it on their own, and if they failed, well, that was on them.” 
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The antidote to this, as dramatically illustrated in the various global responses to 
the current pandemic, is for governments to measure progress in broader terms 
than individual success. If some individuals benefit, but labour markets as a whole 
weaken, we must consider how platforms may be contributing structurally and 
systemically to the erosion of decent work.  We must also consider interventions that 
empower workers — and particularly those who have been restricted or excluded 
from traditional labour markets — collectively rather than individually. An individual 
worker constrained by unpaid care burdens and offered a choice of flexible work may 
be better off individually. However, when an entire community or class of such workers 
is collectively made available to labour markets, collective consequences may look 
very different than individual consequences. Suri and Gray’s data on platforms notably 
revealed that the vast majority of work on platforms is performed by approximately 
20 percent of the available workforce; these workers are putting in full-time hours. 
While Suri and Gray do not provide gender breakdowns, it is likely that those putting 
full-time hours into platform work are disproportionately male. Yet, as they note, the 
80 percent of workers conducting 20 percent of the work are extremely important for 
continued labour arbitrage. With our assumptions on gender, the logical conclusion is 
that those working part time and around unpaid care duties are serving to undermine 
terms and conditions of work for those working full time on platforms.
It would be naïve to assume platform companies will be neutral actors on this topic, as 
they are direct beneficiaries of the effects of platform-discipline. Capital concentration 
in the digital sector and shifts in social capital pose obstacles to policy solutions; these 
can be countered if policymakers reject the narrative of self-reliance and consider how 
well platforms are serving to shift overall labour market dynamics — and particularly 
for disadvantaged groups — toward decent work. 
The rabbit hole is real
The ways in which algorithms on social media serve to engage users through the 
display of increasingly extreme content are now well-documented (The Social 
Dilemma, 2021). Former Google engineer Guillaume Chaslot coined the term “rabbit 
hole” to describe the ways in which these algorithmic nudges amplify not only more 
and more extreme content, but ultimately extreme and sometimes violent behaviors. 
One corollary to this finding is that there is a likely interplay between the gender 
digital divide and the rabbit hole that serves to amplify gender-based violence. 
Algorithms in all forms of virtual space have been trained on biased data, as initial 
gender digital divides resulted in far more men than women online. Trained on men’s 
preferences and expressions of implicit bias, algorithms have amplified those qualities, 
rewarding users for engaging with content that further reinforced gender bias and 
gender-based violence (Noble 2018). This, in turn, has further constricted women’s 
ability to engage comfortably in virtual space. Some women have expressed the 
feeling they “should not be on the internet” (After Access 2020).
Policymakers must address the increasingly toxic online environment if they want 
to ensure gender equity in access to platform work, or any kind of work requiring an 
online presence. To date, the responses to increasing online sexual harassment have 
been episodic and not systematic. Holding individual perpetrators of harassment 
accountable is insufficient to disrupt the snowballing amplification of extreme content 
and its widespread chilling effects. Policymakers concerned with gender-based 
violence in the world of work must consider the need for broader efforts to rein in the 
algorithms that amplify and provoke violence across all virtual spaces.
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There is nothing new about gig work; informal work, and associated precarity, have long been 
more norm than exception throughout the world. Yet there is no reason why platforms should 
reinforce informality and precarity. Policy and public investment choices can play a role in 
promoting pathways to decent work. Recent multilateral and expert reports focused on the future 
of work, gender and digital economy, and platform work have provided solid recommendations 
for strengthened employment and social protection for platform workers. Some reports have also 
identified investing in the care economy as essential to creating genuine flexibility and choice 
for platform workers subject to unpaid care burdens. The author of this paper supports such 
recommendations and seeks here to cover ground that is not fully addressed in those reports. 
Interventions based on approaches to informality in older forms of work will miss the mark when 
applied to platforms that, while claiming to be mere bulletin boards, may be aggregating millions 
of jobs, setting wages, and determining all aspects of working conditions. That is why this paper has 
stressed that creating pathways to formality for informal platform workers requires stepping away 
from the industry-perpetuated narrative of entrepreneurship and completely rethinking how we 
understand autonomy and control over the means of production in a data-driven economy. The 




Recommendation 1: Create transparency and regulatory authority 
over algorithms to address algorithmic discrimination
Labour law and regulation generally, and workplace anti-discrimination protections 
specifically, cannot be applied to platform work as currently designed. Platform companies 
have marketed themselves as intermediaries, simply connecting self-employed individuals 
with gigs. The ways in which algorithms control work and workers have been masked in this 
narrative. To address this, policymakers must develop new regulations fit for an economy 
where data and algorithms are part and parcel of labour relations. 
Digital rights advocates, in particular those in LMICs, are at the forefront of understanding the 
need for citizens to be able to negotiate over data extraction and its uses. “The key subject of 
data control is indeed going to be the major point of conflict between corporate advocates 
and those defending development and the public interest in years to come,” advocates note 
(ALIA, 2019). Thus, to address equity in platform work, policymakers must regulate what data is 
collected from platform users, who may access it, and how it is used (Gurumurthy and Chami 2020). 
Importantly, citizens must have collective representation in data governance. Some digital 
rights activists have suggested individualized solutions, such as empowering individuals to 
opt out of data collection (this approach is now part of Europe’s Generalized Data Protection 
Regulation). These proposals belie the fact that data is only a valuable resource in the 
aggregate. A recent pathbreaking suit brought by Uber drivers in the U.K. has argued that, 
even if workers had access to their individual personal data, it would have no value without 
reference to the full set of other users (Athreya 2021). A critical point here is that access to 
or control over data itself is not enough; there must also be transparency, access and ability 
to negotiate over automated decision-making, or the algorithms applied to such data. This 
is particularly important in enabling women and marginalized groups to address possible 
algorithmic bias. 
Platform companies rely on user data, yet the data sets they maintain are not transparent. They 
could easily be made so. To address bias, auditable data trails will be needed, and governments 
and civil society stakeholders, in particular worker organizations and consumer groups, will 
need not only the right to access information, but also sufficient legal protections so they 
can contest discriminatory applications. Governments will need to consider amendments to 
anti-discrimination and commercial codes to provide such protections. A recent New York 
City council bill provides an interesting potential model, though its application is limited to 
platforms used for hiring (Givens et. al. 2021). LMICs may be able to lead the way in this area; 
digital rights advocates in India, for example, have proposed ambitious data governance 
proposals that could incorporate such provisions (Singh 2020).
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Recommendation 2: Put humans in the loop, collectively 
and on both sides of the table
Policymakers also must address the problem of collective agency for platform workers in ways 
that go beyond traditional industrial relations frameworks. In short, we must put humans back in 
the loop on both sides of the bargaining table. On the worker side, creating space, support, and 
legal status for new forms of organizing will be critical. On the other side of the table, platform 
companies must be required to identify principals who can be held accountable for decisions that 
affect workers, whether or not they directly employ such workers. 
This does not necessarily mean simply shoehorning platforms into traditional employment 
frameworks. Platforms are not merely labour brokers. Their control over terms and conditions 
of work for very large and sometimes geographically dispersed pools of workers has effects 
throughout economies. Platform companies exercise a sophisticated ability to penetrate labour 
markets and substantially direct economic activity. Companies with the capacity to manipulate 
large data sets also have the capacity to set parameters, such as floor wages, and adapt services 
accordingly. Importantly, given their access to client data, platform companies must be held 
accountable for assigning workers to situations where they may face harassment or abuse. This 
accountability will not be possible unless companies identify those who will bear responsibility. 
This paper has noted that platform workers are engaging in creative organizing using WhatsApp 
and other social media platforms. Apparently, isolated and vulnerable workers have found one 
another and are building communities online. The best evidence of effective transitions from 
online organizing to offline collective action are in sectors that are male dominated, in particular 
transportation and delivery. This seems to reflect the fact that such workers are able to connect 
offline in public spaces; delivery workers and drivers have noted that their informal chats in public 
spaces such as the parking lots of restaurants or airport waiting lots spurred the creation of more 
permanent, albeit still informal, groups (Wells and Attoh 2020). Labour laws have not sufficiently 
covered such groups’ right to bargain collectively. Recent victories for platform workers in Europe, 
where unions are relatively strong, are important. But workers in other countries may require new 
forms of coverage for their collective rights. Platform workers might draw from notable examples 
worldwide of informal worker associations such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association in 
India, International Domestic Workers Federation, HomeNet, and StreetNet. A new network of 
online drivers, the International Alliance of App-Based Transportation Workers, was launched in 
early 2020 and is seeking to build a global network similar to the International Domestic Workers 
Federation model.
A movement to organize platform workers into cooperatives is also providing a vitally useful 
alternative to the current platform business model (Scholz 2015). In Indonesia, laws governing 
cooperatives have provided the necessary space for platform workers to associate and bargain 
with platforms. In other countries, however, cooperative laws do not enable such bargaining. Thus, 
platform cooperatives are in most contexts useful only as an alternative business model and not as 
a bargaining unit. While such models provide helpful alternatives to workers, it will be difficult for 
any of them to reach scale in a market where the imperative is toward data monopolization. There 
will be a need for platform worker advocates, and a nascent but growing group of platform worker 
organizers, to form alliances with larger organizations that have built some of the critical social 
infrastructure needed to reach and engage large numbers of isolated and precarious workers. 
Digitization may have a silver lining if advocates can harness it. In economies with greater digital 
penetration, such as the United States, organizations such as the National Domestic Workers’ 
Alliance have effectively engaged in online-to-offline organizing with women workers in a 
hard-to-organize sector. As more and more precarious work worldwide shifts online, so too may 
the potential for organizers and advocates to develop new social networks that connect and 
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Policymakers must build guardrails that ensure 
equity for workers
Platforms can enable decent work on equitable terms for all workers. Yet most 
platforms do not do so today. The fault is not with the technology, but with the 
decisions regarding its use. Platforms and APIs could be used to increase workers’ 
access to information and choices; instead, this information is used to impose new 
forms of control and discipline. Algorithms could be coded to address and mitigate 
labour market inequities; instead, they often amplify existing discrimination. 
Alternatives supporting decent work, such as platform cooperatives, are insufficient to 
correct for a widespread business model that has locked in such choices. 
Policymakers will have to step in and create guardrails for platform workers. These new 
guardrails must include worker-centered data governance and legal constraints on the 
use of APIs that perpetuate algorithmic bias and gender-based violence. They must 
also sustain meaningful opportunities for platform workers to have a collective voice 
on the terms and conditions of their work. Clearly these are not the only challenges to 
be addressed to ensure gender equity in the future of work. The recommendations in 
this paper are simply a single contribution to systemic efforts to address the promise 
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